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ABSTRACT 
The Western Australian Government stated that the Criminal Property Confiscation 
Act 2000 (WA) (‘CPCA’) will provide ‘the strongest and most effective’ confiscation 
powers in the world.1  It was observed by the High Court that the CPCA has enabled 
a confiscation of property scheme that has a ‘significant impact upon personal and 
property rights.’2  Strong powers to fight crime are justified, but it is critical that 
these powers are used responsibly and that innocent parties are protected.  This 
thesis considers the extent to which the objection to confiscation provisions in 
Part 6 of the CPCA (‘the protections’) operate to protect the family home of an 
‘innocent party’.   
 
Any Act that enables the state to deprive an innocent person of their family home 
is a significant piece of legislation demanding a thorough examination.  
Surprisingly, this is something which has only occurred to a limited extent in 
academic scholarship at this point in time.  This thesis will address this short-
coming by providing a thorough overview of the protections for the family homes 
of innocent parties from confiscation, identifying issues arising from these 
protections and providing commentary on possible amendments to these 
protections.   
                                                          
 
1 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
2 Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2006) 226 CLR 486, 491 [5], quoted in 
Musikanth, Alain, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial 
Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on 
the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 1. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) (‘CPCA’) is an Act that enables 
the State of Western Australia to deprive its citizens of privately-owned assets, ‘a 
highly intrusive act of state.’3  The CPCA commenced on January 1, 2001,4 replacing 
the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) which was believed to be 
‘inadequate and outdated legislation.’5  The CPCA, on the other hand, was ‘a new 
weapon in the fight against criminal activity’, particularly in relation to organised 
crime and the drug trade.6  The Government of the time firmly believed that the 
CPCA, ‘will be the strongest and most effective [Act] of its kind in the world.’7   
 
The CPCA departed from the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) in a 
number of ways.8  The most significant of these reforms was a move from a 
conviction based regime to a non-conviction based regime, following a 
recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission.9  Whereas the Crimes 
(Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) only allowed confiscation when ‘a person 
is convicted of a serious offence’,10 the CPCA allows confiscation to occur even 
                                                          
 
3 Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It?  How to Take People’s Homes Without 
Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 
Criminal Law Journal 263, 263. 
4 Peter Foss, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000- 68 of 2000’ in Western Australia, Western 
Australian Government Gazette, No 285, 29 December 2000, 7901, 7903  
5 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 For a useful summary of the changes see, Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It?  How 
to Take People’s Homes Without Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property Confiscation 
Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 Criminal Law Journal 263, 271-2. 
9 Australian Law Reform Commission, Confiscation that Counts: A Review of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1987, Report No 87 (1999) 84; Stephen Hall and Jeff Scholz, ‘Ill-gotten gains?’ (2000) 27(11) 
Brief 6, 8. 
10 Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) s 6(1). 
8 
 
 
when no offence has been committed.11  Proceedings under the CPCA are civil, 
rather than criminal, which is significant due to the application of a lesser 
evidentiary standard (the balance of probabilities) and civil rules of evidence, 
which increases the ease by which the State can secure a confiscation.12  This task 
is made even easier because the CPCA admits opinion and hearsay evidence on 
behalf of the State in certain circumstances.13  Additionally, the onus of proof may 
in some situations be reversed, so the individual must establish the property was 
lawfully acquired.14   
 
The intention of the CPCA is to enable ‘confiscation of proceeds of criminal activity 
and property used in criminal activity.’15  Section 4 of the CPCA provides five bases 
of confiscation to achieve this objective.16  The first is unexplained wealth, which 
occurs when ‘the total value of a person’s wealth exceeds the value of the person’s 
lawfully acquired wealth’.17  Criminal benefits can be confiscated, which refers to 
‘property, services, advantages and benefits obtained by a person who has been 
involved in the commission of a confiscation offence’.18  Thirdly, property that is 
crime-used, which is ‘property used in or in connection with commission of a 
                                                          
 
11 See, eg, CPCA ss 4(a), 5(2)(c). 
12 CPCA s 102; Natalie Skead and Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’ 
(2015) 38(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 455, 465. 
13 CPCA s 105. 
14 See, eg, CPCA ss 12(2), 82(1), 83(1). 
15 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
16 See also Joseph McGrath, ‘Responding on Behalf of a Client whose Assets are Frozen by the 
State: Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional 
Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 
March 2009) 3. 
17 CPCA s 4(a). 
18 CPCA s 4(b). 
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confiscation offence’19 is confiscable.  Crime-derived property can be confiscated, 
which is ‘property derived directly or indirectly from the commission of a 
confiscation offence’.20  The final type of property that may be confiscated is 
property that is or was owned by a declared drug trafficker.21  In relation to crime-
used property, a secondary base of confiscation exists when the crime-used 
property is not available for confiscation.22  This is known as crime-used property 
substitution and enables confiscation of property equal in value to the crime-used 
property from the respondent.23  As drug trafficker and crime-used property 
confiscation are the most commonly used grounds of confiscation, these bases will 
be the primary focus of this thesis.24   
 
Despite the ‘significant impact of the legislation upon personal and property 
rights’,25 the CPCA has received little scholarly attention.  Existing scholarly work 
is focused on the various bases of confiscation described above.26  The impact of 
confiscation on innocent parties, such as the innocent wife who has the family 
                                                          
 
19 CPCA s 4(c). 
20 CPCA s 4(d). 
21 CPCA s 4(e). 
22 CPCA s 22. 
23 CPCA s 23(1). 
24 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 1. 
25 Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2006) 226 CLR 486, 491 [5], quoted in 
Musikanth, Alain, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial 
Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on 
the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 1. 
26 See, eg, Natalie Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia 
Law Journal 67; Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law 
Journal 296; Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime 
Legislation in Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), 
Property and Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011). 
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home confiscated as a result of her husband’s drug trafficking, has escaped 
significant scrutiny.27  The potential for the CPCA to produce this outcome was 
acknowledged by the Western Australian Parliament and provisions were included 
in the CPCA to protect innocent parties from these ‘unjust consequences’ (‘the 
protections’).28  As the CPCA has been described as ‘perplexing and difficult to 
construe’,29 lacking ‘coherence’ and being ‘drafted unsatisfactorily’,30 the mere 
existence of these protections is unlikely to provide significant reassurance to an 
innocent party.     
 
This thesis will seek to examine these protections by considering the following four 
questions; firstly, how is an innocent party defined by the CPCA, secondly, what is 
the scope of the protections available to protect the family home of an innocent 
party, thirdly, what issues have arisen from these protections and fourthly, how 
these protections may be improved.  Currently there are no secondary sources 
that directly address these research questions.  These questions are of critical 
importance as depriving citizens of privately-owned assets is a ‘highly intrusive act 
                                                          
 
27 Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 296. 
28 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8613 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
29 Centurion Trust Company Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2010) 201 A Crim R 324, 
343 [75] (Owen JA) (‘Centurion’), quoted in Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 
2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 
November 2015) 2. 
30 Transcript of Proceedings, Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Centurion Trust Company Ltd 
[2011] HCATrans 88 (8 April 2011), quoted in Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation 
Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 
November 2015) 2. 
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of state’.31  This is particularly so when the asset in question is the home of 
innocent people, who are ‘innocent’ not just in a general sense, but as defined by 
the Act that enables the confiscation.32  By focussing on these four questions, a 
thorough overview of the protections for the family home of innocent parties will 
be provided, as well as a consideration of the significant issues arising from the 
protections and recommendations for improving the operation of the protections.   
Due to the vast scope of potential hypothetical issues that could be considered in 
relation to the protections, this thesis will be focused on issues that have emerged 
from the case law to date.33  
 
Although it is acknowledged that a number of issues exist in relation to the 
confiscation powers contained in the CPCA, this thesis will not be addressing these 
issues.34  This thesis is focused on the protections, and any proposed 
improvements will be in relation to the protections, not to the confiscation 
powers.35  These improvements will focus on ensuring that the protections are 
coherent and consistent, as opposed to radically changing the CPCA.  Additionally, 
                                                          
 
31 Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It?  How to Take People’s Homes Without 
Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 
Criminal Law Journal 263, 263. 
32 This definition will be discussed in chapter four. 
33 An example of a hypothetical issue is found in Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It?  
How to Take People’s Homes Without Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property 
Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 Criminal Law Journal 263, 269-70. 
34 Examples of these issues include the constitutional validity of the drug trafficker confiscation 
scheme and the scope of the crime-used property definition.  On these issues see Natalie Skead, 
‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: 
A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 306-12 and Natalie 
Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: Laws 
Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia Law Journal 67, 69-72. 
35 This is largely due to the fact that the confiscation powers have attracted some scholarly 
attention, while the protections have received only brief consideration.   
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the definition of ‘innocent party’ that is provided in the CPCA will not be critically 
evaluated.  The question of how to define innocence, particularly in the context of 
a non-conviction based confiscation scheme, is philosophically complex and 
beyond the scope of this thesis.   
 
Before considering the research questions, literature relevant to the topic will first 
be considered and critiqued, with any gaps in the literature being identified.  
Chapter three will then consider why a traditional research methodology will be 
adopted for this thesis.  This will involve a discussion of the research 
methodologies utilitised by previous authors on the CPCA and the strengths and 
weaknesses of these approaches.  These approaches will then be compared to the 
methodology to be applied in this thesis, which will also be critically assessed.  
Chapters four to seven will then consider the four questions in the order stated 
above.  The final chapter will contain a conclusion on the findings of this thesis.   
 
Any Act that potentially enables the state to deprive an innocent person of their 
family home is an exceptional piece of legislation that demands a thorough 
examination.  This thesis will perform this examination, clarifying to what extent 
the family home of an innocent party is protected under the CPCA, as well as 
observing issues with the protections and recommendations for improvements.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are very few secondary sources that address the CPCA.  The only authors 
who have produced peer reviewed literature that considers innocent parties 
under the CPCA are Dr Natalie Skead and Dr Ben Clarke.  The limited scholarship 
in this area is acknowledged by Skead who writes, ‘there is little scholarship on the 
impact of the legislation on the property rights of defendants, and more 
importantly, innocent third parties.’36  As the literature by Clarke is dated and only 
addresses the research question in passing, this review will focus primarily on the 
work of Skead.  In addition to being the most relevant, her work is also the most 
recent and the most extensive.  The remaining sources considered by this 
literature review are non-peer reviewed papers by Mr Edward Greaves, Mr Joseph 
McGrath, Mr Alain Musikanth and Mr Michael Seaman.   
 
II. DEFINING INNOCENT PARTIES 
Although every source acknowledges the possible adverse ramifications of the 
CPCA on innocent parties,37 there is very little scholarship on who an ‘innocent 
party’ is under the CPCA.  Skead notes that the CPCA does define ‘innocent party’ 
but does not include the definition or provide any commentary regarding the 
                                                          
 
36 Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 296. 
37 See, eg, Joseph McGrath, ‘Responding on Behalf of a Client whose Assets are Frozen by the 
State: Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional 
Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 
March 2009) 21 (written prior to his Honour’s appointment to the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia). 
14 
 
 
definition.38  This is due to the definition in the CPCA being in reference to crime-
used and crime-derived property only, while Skead’s chapter focuses on 
unexplained wealth.  However, her work would have been complemented by a 
consideration of the definition, as the ‘innocent party’ criteria most likely still 
applies to unexplained wealth declarations, as Skead herself acknowledges.39  
Greaves observes that the definition provided in sections 153(3) and (4) of the 
CPCA draws on well-known principles of property law and as a result requires little 
further explanation.40  This is a reasonable conclusion, however the definition 
provided in sections 153(1) and (2) does not have an equivalent level of clarity.41  
The definition of ‘innocent party’ is critical as it is central to a number of the 
protections contained in the CPCA.  As the literature indicates a clear awareness 
of the possible issues for innocent parties, it is surprising that the definition in the 
CPCA is usually overlooked and in the rare instances when it is noted, is passed 
over very briefly.42 
 
                                                          
 
38 Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in 
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and 
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 215. 
39 Ibid 216. 
40 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 17-8.  These principles being 
the concept of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 
41 Greaves does briefly discuss the case of Lambert v Western Australia (2014) 240 A Crim R 268 
in which the spouse of a drug trafficker objected to the confiscation of the family home on the 
grounds that she was an innocent party, see Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 
2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 
November 2015) 18. 
42 See, eg, Joseph McGrath, ‘Responding on Behalf of a Client whose Assets are Frozen by the 
State: Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional 
Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 
March 2009) 12. 
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III. PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO INNOCENT PARTIES 
Part 6 of the CPCA contains provisions that enable property to be released if 
certain criteria are satisfied.43  Of particular relevance are sections 82, 83 and 87, 
which specifically refer to innocent parties, while section 84 provides a general 
objection provision that is indirectly relevant.  
 
Sections 82 and 83 are similar provisions that provide for the release of crime-used 
and crime-derived property respectively.  Lamers v Western Australia44  is 
discussed by a number of authors to illustrate how strictly the hardship provision 
in section 82(3) is applied by the court.45  In this case, the family home was 
confiscated as a result of a drug trafficker declaration.  Notably the hardship 
provision only applies to crime-used property, a feature that has escaped any 
detailed attention in the literature.46  
 
                                                          
 
43 For a summary of the various criteria, see Appendix 1.  In the context of sections 82, 83 and 84 
the property is ‘released’ in the sense that the freezing notice or freezing order is set aside.  In 
relation to section 87, the property is released by the making of a court order for the release of 
the confiscated property (CPCA s 87(1)). 
44 (2009) 192 A Crim R 471. 
45 Natalie Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia Law 
Journal 67, 78-81; Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and 
Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 14-21; 
Michael Seaman, ‘Recent Developments in Respect to the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 
2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets 
by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 5. 
46 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 20; Michael Seaman, ‘Recent 
Developments in Respect to the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at 
Continuing Professional Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society 
of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 5. 
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For a release to be granted under section 87, the applicant must meet five criteria.  
The final criterion, that any other owner must also be an innocent party in relation 
to the property, significantly limits the protection available to an innocent party.  
Skead and Clarke both agree that this condition results in a number of difficulties 
and inequities.47  Skead provides a useful case study of this issue using Director of 
Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Le.48  
 
The final relevant section to innocent parties is section 84, which has attracted 
significant attention.49  Skead’s 2011 article is of particular value and represents 
the most detailed analysis of any of the protections in the CPCA.  Skead argues 
that the assistance provided by section 84 is limited and inadequate.50  This is 
because if a property is frozen as it is subject to confiscation, innocent parties are 
prevented from dealing with the property.  Dealing with frozen property is a 
                                                          
 
47 Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in 
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and 
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 216-7; Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s 
Home is His Castle- Or Is It?  How to Take People’s Homes Without Convicting them of Anything: 
The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 Criminal Law Journal 263, 269. 
48 (2007) 232 CLR 562; Natalie Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western 
Australia Law Journal 67, 73-4. 
49 Alain Musikanth, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial 
Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on 
the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 9; 
Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in Australia 
Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and 
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 211-2; Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-
trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: A 
Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 304; Natalie Skead and 
Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’ (2015) 38(2) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 455, 483. 
50 Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in 
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and 
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 211. 
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serious offence unless the offender did not know or could not reasonably have 
known that the property was frozen.51  ‘Deal’ is defined broadly in section 151 of 
the CPCA to cover most conceivable actions in relation to property.  Skead52 cites 
Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Western Australia53 and Permanent Custodians Ltd v 
Western Australia54 as examples of the inadequacy of these provisions for an 
innocent party, albeit parties with a commercial interest in property.  
 
Despite common agreement amongst the authors about the risks the CPCA poses 
for innocent parties, there is very little literature on the scope of the protections 
the CPCA provides generally, and for the family home specifically.  It is only the 
work of Skead, particularly her 2011, 2013 and 2016 works, and the work of 
Greaves that goes beyond a superficial commentary of the issues and discusses 
some of the protections provided by the CPCA in detail.  Beyond the work of Skead 
and Greaves, the remaining secondary sources are of little relevance to the 
research questions.  Despite the significant value of the work by Skead and 
Greaves, these contributions are still limited due to their focus on a particular 
confiscation power, rather than focussing on innocent parties and considering the 
protections as a whole.  This is a significant gap in the research and as a result it is 
difficult to make any comment about the extent of the protections in the CPCA.   
                                                          
 
51 CPCA ss 50(1), 50(3). 
52 Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in 
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and 
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 211-12; Natalie Skead and 
Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’ (2015) 38(2) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 455, 483. 
53 (2002) 26 WAR 1. 
54 [2006] WASC 225 (29 September 2006). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The lack of protection for innocent parties is an issue that has been observed in 
the literature but not addressed in great depth.  As demonstrated, the existing 
literature deals only with protections available to innocent parties in specific 
circumstances and in limited detail.   There is simply no literature that provides 
any sort of overview of the protections available to innocent parties from the 
confiscation powers contained in the CPCA or any consideration of how these 
protections apply to the family home.  The absence of detailed consideration of 
the definition of ‘innocent party’ is indicative of the limited scholarship in this area.   
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The topic being addressed is to what extent do the objection provisions contained 
in Part 6 of the CPCA protect the family home of an 'innocent party' from 
confiscation?  This topic will consider the following four research questions; how 
is an innocent party defined by the CPCA, what is the scope of the protections 
available to protect the family home of an innocent party, what issues have arisen 
from these protections and how these protections may be improved.  There are 
no secondary sources that directly address these research questions.  The 
secondary sources that do indirectly address the research questions all adopt a 
traditional ‘black-letter’ law approach, such as Skead55 and Greaves.56  These 
sources seek to derive principles from the legislation and the decided cases, 
making the traditional approach the appropriate methodology.  As the goal of this 
research is to provide a comprehensive overview of the protections provided in 
the CPCA in relation to the family home of an innocent party, it is appropriate that 
this research also adopts this traditional approach.   
 
                                                          
 
55 See, eg, Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation 
in Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property 
and Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011). 
56 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015). 
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II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
The traditional approach, often called ‘black-letter law’ or the doctrinal approach, 
focuses on ‘deriving principles and values from decided cases and re-assembling 
decided cases into a coherent framework.’57  Accordingly, this traditional approach 
relies heavily on legislation and case law.  As this thesis is an analysis of legislation 
and its application, the traditional approach is the most appropriate.  This thesis 
will consider the definition of innocent party and the extent of the protections 
available to protect the family home of an innocent party by considering the 
relevant sections of the legislation, which will include a discussion of relevant case 
law and legislative materials.  The consideration of the issues that have arisen from 
these protections and possible improvements will then be considered primarily by 
reference to case law, using legislative materials and secondary sources as 
required.   
 
It is acknowledged that the traditional approach has been criticised for being 
inward-looking and failing to understand the operation of law in society.58  It is 
also limited in that it can only serve as a general guide that needs to be applied to 
a particular set of facts.  Non-traditional research seeks to overcome these issues 
by incorporating other disciplines,59 and in so doing considers the law in a broader 
                                                          
 
57 Mike McConvill and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University, 
2007) 1. 
58 Ibid 4-5. 
59 Such as sociology, political science and economics, see Mike McConvill and Wing Hong Chui 
(eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University, 2007) 5. 
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social and political context.60  Some non-traditional methods, such as interviewing 
innocent parties may provide some insight, particularly as the majority of 
confiscation objections do not proceed to a hearing,61 but such a method would 
require a considerable investment of resources with no guarantee of adding 
significant value to the thesis.  Despite the limitations of the traditional 
methodology, and the potential benefits of non-traditional methods, on balance 
it is considered that the traditional methodology is the appropriate tool with which 
to address these research questions.   
 
Although the use of the traditional research methodology is common in the 
literature, this thesis will be novel as a result of its focus and scope.  Despite all 
secondary sources acknowledging the potential injustice that could occur for 
innocent parties as a result of the CPCA, there are no sources that provide a 
detailed analysis of the protections from confiscation available to innocent parties.  
As the CPCA enables property to be confiscated under five main heads, the 
majority of secondary literature is focussed on one or two of these particular 
heads.  There are numerous examples of this approach, such as the work of 
Skead62 and Greaves,63 which provides two examples in relation to crime-used 
property.   
                                                          
 
60 Ibid 5. 
61 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Drug Trafficker Cases’ (Paper 
presented at Legalwise Seminar, 26 March 2015) 4. 
62 Natalie Skead, ‘Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?’ (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia Law 
Journal 67. 
63 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 3. 
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This approach is problematic to the extent that there is no research that identifies 
common problems across the protections and no commentary regarding the 
protections as a whole.  Rather, the secondary sources deal with the protections 
in isolation, which is valuable in relation to that particular protection, but of little 
assistance in determining the scope of the protections as a whole.  As this thesis 
is not focussing on a particular confiscation power, but rather focusses on 
innocent parties, it will be a new contribution to the field.  This focus on innocent 
parties provides a framework to the thesis and avoids the often piecemeal 
approach to this issue evident in the secondary sources to this point.   
 
The distinction between descriptive and analytical research is a relevant one to 
this research topic.  Descriptive research seeks to describe the state of affairs as it 
exists at the present, while analytical research seeks to use the facts or 
information available to make a critical evaluation of the material.64  This thesis 
will do both, as chapters four and five will describe the state of affairs in relation 
to innocent parties and the protections available to them through an analysis of 
the legislation and case law.  Chapters five and six will then examine issues that 
have arisen from the protections and provide suggestions to address these issues.  
To adopt the slightly different language of Bell, this thesis will seek to answer both 
                                                          
 
64 C R Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Age Publishers, 2nd ed, 
2004) 2-3. 
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analytical and normative questions.  Analytical questions attempt to define the 
legal rules, while normative questions address what the law should be.65   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The traditional research approach is an appropriate methodology to adopt for this 
thesis.  It is the same methodology adopted by the secondary sources, which is 
unsurprising, as this literature also seeks to clarify the law on the topic by analysis 
of the legislation and case law.  The contribution of the thesis to existing 
scholarship arises from a consideration of the CPCA as a whole with regard to the 
protections available for the family home of an innocent party.  This holistic 
approach will address significant gaps regarding the protections for innocent 
parties in the scholarship to date.   
  
                                                          
 
65 John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke 
(ed), Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart, Oxford, 2011) 157. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEFINING INNOCENT PARTIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to determine the scope of the protections for innocent parties contained 
in the CPCA, it is essential to firstly determine who exactly is an ‘innocent party’.  
This chapter seeks to explain the scope of this definition, firstly by reference to the 
CPCA itself, and secondly by considering how the definition has been applied by 
the judiciary.  This definition is critical, as a number of the protections depend on 
the person making the objection fulfilling the innocent party definition.   
 
II. INNOCENT PARTY 
Section 153 of the CPCA defines an ‘innocent party’.  The definition has four 
subsections, subsections one to three relate to crime-used property, while 
subsection four relates to crime-derived property.   
 
A. Sections 153(1) and (2) 
Section 153(1) provides that an innocent party in relation to crime-used property 
is a person who was not involved in the offence and did not know, and had no 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the relevant confiscation offence was 
being or would be committed, or took all reasonable steps to prevent its 
commission.  It is directed towards circumstances where the relevant criminal act 
was committed on the property.66  Under section 153(2), also in relation to crime-
used property, a person is an innocent party if that party did not know, and had 
                                                          
 
66 Stribrny v Western Australia [2015] WASC (22 October 2015) [59] (Tottle J). 
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no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property was being or would be 
used in the commission of the offence; or took all reasonable steps to prevent the 
use of the property in the commission of the offence.  In contrast to section 153(1), 
section 153(2) is directed at circumstances where the property was used in, or in 
connection with, the relevant offence.67   
 
A simple application of sections 153(1) and 153(2) of the CPCA is found in Powell 
v The State of Western Australia.68  Mr Powell had pleaded guilty to a number of 
drug related offences after a search by police had located 21 cannabis plants and 
additional cannabis material69 in a shed on the property.  Cannabis was also found 
in the master bedroom and on a table on the porch of the residence.70  Ms 
Murphy, Mr Powell’s de facto partner, was found not to be an innocent party as 
she knew the relevant confiscation offence was being committed on the property 
and did not ‘attempt to prevent the commission of the offences or the use of the 
property for that purpose’.71 
 
                                                          
 
67 Stribrny v Western Australia [2015] WASC 396 [59]. 
68 [2014] WASC 435 (20 November 2014). 
69 Specifically: 
two vacuum sealed bags containing 877 g of processed cannabis head, six cannabis 
plants (weighing a total of 1.331 kg) in the process of being dried, a further bag 
containing 20 g of cannabis material and a black plastic bag containing cannabis leaf and 
stem which was unusable.  
Powell v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 435 (20 November 2014) [3]. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid [28]. 
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B. Sections 153(3) and (4) 
Sections 153(3) and (4) of the CPCA both relate to situations where a person has 
acquired the property after the property has been crime-used or crime-derived.72  
In Greaves’ opinion these subsections provide that a person is an innocent party 
in relation to both crime-used and crime-derived property if they are a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice.73  Any transaction that takes place with the 
‘intention of avoiding the operation’ of the CPCA is specifically excluded under 
both subsections.74  Sections 153(3) and (4) have not been the subject of judicial 
consideration.   
 
III. REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR SUPSECTING 
An essential condition in all four subsections is that the person ‘did not know and 
had no reasonable grounds for suspecting’.75  An example of how this phrase is 
applied is found in Lambert v Western Australia.76  In Lambert the police located 
33 plants of cannabis being hydroponically grown in a rear shed in close 
proximity to the house by Mr Russell, the partner of Ms Lambert.77  Ms Lambert 
contended that she was an innocent party as she was not involved in the 
commission of the offence and did not know, and had no reasonable grounds for 
                                                          
 
72 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 17-8. 
73 Ibid. 
74 CPCA s 153(3)(d), 153(4)(e). 
75 In relation to subsection one this applies to suspicion that the confiscation offence was being 
or would be committed. Subsection two relates to suspicion the property was being or would be 
used in or in connection with the commission of the relevant confiscation offence.  In subsections 
three and four the suspicion relates to the property being crime-used and crime-derived 
respectively. See CPCA ss 153(1)(b), 153(2)(a), 153(3)(b), 153(4)(d). 
76 Lambert v Western Australia 2014) 240 A Crim R 268 (‘Lambert’). 
77 Ibid 269, 278. 
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suspecting that the offence was being committed.  As noted by Commissioner 
Sleight in Lambert,78 the High Court established in George v Rockett that:  
When a statute prescribes that there must be "reasonable grounds" for a state of 
mind - including suspicion and belief - it requires the existence of facts which are 
sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.79 
Ms Lambert failed in her application based on the existence of a number of facts, 
primarily the elaborate nature of the hydroponic system and its close proximity to 
the house.80  The facts made it ‘improbable’ Ms Lambert was not aware of the 
drug cultivation.81  As she did not satisfy the innocent party definition, her 
objection was dismissed and the family home was confiscated.82 
 
A similar scenario to Lambert occurred in Stribrny v Western Australia.83  Here Mr 
Stribrny established an elaborate and sophisticated hydroponic system in the rear 
bedrooms of the family home.84  Ms Stribrna, the wife of Mr Stribrny, claimed to 
be an innocent party.  Justice Tottle accepted the submission that knowledge or 
reasonable grounds for suspicion must be made out, ‘in respect of each element 
of the relevant confiscation offence or wilful blindness to those elements.’85  The 
relevant elements in Stribrny were the cultivation of cannabis and an intent to sell 
                                                          
 
78 Ibid 275. 
79 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104, 112. 
80 Lambert v Western Australia (2014) 240 A Crim R 268, 278-280. 
81 Ibid 278.  As section 102(1) of the CPCA establishes that applications made under the CPCA are 
civil proceedings, a question of fact is to be decided on the balance of probabilities. 
82 Lambert v Western Australia (2014) 240 A Crim R 268, 284. 
83 Stribrny v Western Australia [2015] WASC 396 (22 October 2015) (‘Stribrny’). 
84 Ibid [44]-[46]. 
85 Ibid [60]. 
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or supply.86  Based on the existence of a similar set of facts to Lambert, Justice 
Tottle was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Ms Stribrna did not 
know that the property was being used for the cultivation of cannabis87 and that 
she did not have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cannabis was being 
grown with intent to sell or supply to others.88 
 
BJF v The State of Western Australia89 presents an unusual contrast.  Here the 
husband, Mr F, was convicted of cultivating cannabis, amongst other offences.90  
The cultivation occurred in a locked shed located between 10 and 20 metres from 
the house.91  There were 17 cannabis plants growing in the shed.92  His wife, Mrs 
F, was found to be an innocent party as she was not involved in the commission of 
any of the confiscation offences and, ‘did not know, and had no reasonable 
grounds to suspect, that any of those offences was being committed.’93  Justice 
Murray does not expand any further on the factual basis for making this 
determination.  In light of Lambert and Stribrny, this conclusion reveals some 
inconsistency in how the definition of innocent party is judicially applied.  The 
decisions in Lambert and Stribrny are respectfully preferred as it is difficult to 
accept that the cultivation of drugs using a hydroponic system in a shed close to 
                                                          
 
86 Ibid [61]. 
87 Ibid [66]. 
88 Ibid [68]. 
89 BJF v The State of Western Australia (2011) 210 A Crim R 262 (‘BJF’). 
90 Ibid 263 [3]. 
91 Ibid 263 [2]. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid 267 [25]. 
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the home would not provide ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting’ the offence was 
occurring. 
 
IV. RELEVANCE TO OTHER BASES OF CONFISCATION 
As has been observed, the innocent party definition in section 153 only applies in 
relation to crime-used property and crime-derived property.  Consequently, its 
relevance to property confiscated on the grounds of an unexplained wealth 
declaration, a criminal benefits declaration, a drug trafficker declaration or a 
crime-used substitution order is unclear.  This was noted in Bennett & Co (a firm) 
v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Australia) where it was observed that, 
‘an objector is only able to establish that they fall within the definition of “innocent 
party” where the property is either crime-used or crime-derived.’94  This issue will 
be considered further in chapters six and seven. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The definition of ‘innocent party’ contained in the CPCA only applies when the 
property is either crime-used or crime-derived.  An innocent person is essentially 
a person that did not know and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
either the confiscation offence was being or would be committed, the property 
was being or would be used in or in connection with the confiscation offence or 
the property was crime-used or crime-derived.  This is a question of fact to be 
determined on the balance of probabilities by considering if facts exist which are 
                                                          
 
94 Bennett & Co (a firm) v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2005) 31 WAR 212, 226 [61].  
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sufficient to induce suspicion in the mind of a reasonable person.  This test is 
applied quite consistently by the court, with the case of BJF appearing to be an 
exception. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROTECTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The CPCA contains four protections available to innocent parties.  These are 
contained in sections 82(4), 83(2), 82(3) and 87(1).  Section 84 contains a 
protection that does not require a party to be innocent, but nonetheless is of 
relevance to innocent parties.  The scope of these sections, and application in 
protecting the family home of innocent parties is considered in this chapter. 
 
It is important to note that any objections made under sections 82, 83 and 84 must 
be filed on or before the 28th day after the service of the freezing notice or 
freezing order,95 although the court can allow further time.96  If no objection is 
filed within this period, the property will be confiscated.97  Once the property is 
confiscated, objections can only occur under section 87.  Objections under section 
87 must occur ‘within 28 days after the person became aware, or can reasonably 
be expected to have become aware, that the property has been confiscated.’98   
                                                          
 
95 CPCA ss 7(1), 79(2), 79(3).  This notice should be served on any interested party, see CPCA ss 
36(1)(b) and 46(1)(b).  An interested party is defined in the glossary to the CPCA as, ‘any person 
with an interest in the property that would enable the person to succeed on an objection to the 
confiscation of the property.’ 
96 CPCA s 79(4). 
97 CPCA s 7(1); Joseph McGrath, ‘Responding on Behalf of a Client whose Assets are Frozen by the 
State: Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional 
Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 
March 2009) 7; see also Alain Musikanth, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on 
Behalf of a Commercial Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing 
Professional Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western 
Australia, 18 March 2009) 6-7. 
98 CPCA s 85(2).   
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II. CRIME-USED AND CRIME-DERIVED PROPERTY99 
Sections 82(4) and 83(2) apply to crime-used and crime-derived property 
respectively.  Both sections enable the court to set aside a freezing notice or a 
freezing order against the interest of an innocent party in a family home providing 
a number of conditions are met as considered below.   
 
A. Sections 82(4) and 83(2) 
Section 82(4) requires the objector to be able to establish that it is more likely than 
not that: 
(a)  the objector is the owner of the property, or is one of 2 or more owners 
of the property; and 
(b)  the property is not effectively controlled by a person who made criminal 
use of the property; and  
(c)  the objector is an innocent party in relation to the property; and 
(d)  each other owner (if there are more than one) is an innocent party in 
relation to the property. 
Section 83(2) repeats conditions (a), (c) and (d).  The only difference is in condition 
(b) which provides, ‘the property is not effectively controlled by a person who 
wholly or partly derived or realised the property, directly or indirectly, from the 
commission of a confiscation offence.’  These conditions are conjunctive and the 
burden of proof is on the objector.100  The term ‘owner’ is defined in the glossary 
                                                          
 
99 A summary of these protections are found in Table 1 of Appendix A. 
100 Natalie Skead, ‘Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?’ (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia Law 
Journal 67, 80. 
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of the CPCA to mean in relation to property, ‘a person who has a legal or equitable 
interest in the property.’  As noted by Greaves, this expansive definition allows for 
these sections to provide a remedy to people who have an interest in the property, 
not just those who are ‘owners’ in the ordinary sense of the word.101   
 
In McLeod v Western Australia102 the second plaintiff (‘the son’), who was the son 
of the first plaintiff (‘the father’),103 objected to the confiscation of the home of 
which he was the sole registered proprietor, and which his father resided.  The 
father had pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, cultivating cannabis and 
possessing cannabis with intent to sell or supply it.104  It was not disputed that the 
property was crime-used and that the son was an innocent party.105  As conditions 
(a) and (c) were not disputed and condition (d) was irrelevant as the son was the 
sole owner, condition (b) was the only issue in dispute.  Effective control is defined 
in section 156(1) of the CPCA: 
A person has effective control of property if the person does not have the legal 
estate in the property, but the property is directly or indirectly subject to the 
control of the person, or is held for the ultimate benefit of the person.106 
For a number of reasons, such as the father’s contribution of $117,417.30 towards 
the purchase of the property, Justice Jenkins was satisfied that the property was 
                                                          
 
101 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 17. 
102 (2015) 248 A Crim R 473 (‘McLeod’). 
103 No disrespect is intended by referring to the parties as ‘the father’ and ‘the son’. 
104 McLeod v Western Australia (2015) 248 A Crim R 473, 474 [3]. 
105 Ibid 476 [17]-[18]. 
106 A non-exhaustive list of considerations that may be taken into account when determining 
effective control is contained in section 156(2).   
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subject to the control of the father.107  As condition (b) was not established, the 
son’s objection to confiscation failed. 
 
B. Sections 82(5) and 83(3) 
Sections 82(5) and 83(3) are substantively identical and provide that if the objector 
establishes the matters set out in conditions (a), (b) and (c) but fails to establish 
(d), the court may order that when the property is sold, that the objector be paid 
an amount equal to the objector’s share in the property.   
 
In Stavrianakos v The State of Western Australia,108 Mr Tony Stavrianakos had 
purchased a home from prize money won in the Saturday lotto.  Ten years after 
purchasing the home, Tony109 was convicted of one count of manufacturing 
methylamphetamine and one count of attempting to manufacture 
methylamphetamine at the home.110  His former de facto partner, Ms Lesley 
Maxfield and their children, Ms Angie Craven, Mr Nick Stavrianakos and Mr 
Jonathan Stavrianakos (the third to sixth plaintiffs) contended that the lotto ticket 
was purchased with contributions from all of them and that as a result he held the 
prize money on trust for them all.111   
                                                          
 
107 Other reasons included that the son purchased the property on the father’s recommendation, 
only the father lived on the property between the time of purchase to when the freezing notice 
was issued, and the son did not know the address of the property when interviewed by the 
police.  See McLeod v Western Australia (2015) 248 A Crim R 473, 487-8 [86]. 
108 Stavrianakos v The State of Western Australia 2016] WASC 64 (3 March 2016) (‘Stavrianakos’). 
109 The parties will be referred to by their first names for ease of identification, no disrespect is 
intended. 
110 Stavrianakos v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASC 64 (3 March 2016) [6]. 
111 Ibid [1].   
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The judgment states that it was ‘common ground’ that the third to sixth plaintiffs 
were innocent parties and that the property was not effectively controlled by 
Tony.112  There is no explanation as to the reasoning behind this agreement.  
Finding that the third to sixth plaintiffs were innocent parties is not surprising as 
Angie and Nick never lived at the property and Lesley and Jonathan had vacated 
the property by early 2000, more than nine years before the police search.  The 
agreement that Tony did not effectively control the property may seem unusual 
in light of the similarity to the circumstances in McLeod, but as the definition of 
effective control in section 156(1) is prescriptive, a person with legal estate in the 
property cannot be found to have effective control of the property. 
 
As a result, conditions (b) and (c) of section 82(4) were satisfied.  Condition (d) 
would not be satisfied as Tony was an owner and not an innocent party.  
Therefore, section 82(5) applied, provided that condition (a) is satisfied, namely 
that the third to sixth plaintiffs were owners of the property.  Justice Tottle found 
that Tony held the property on constructive trust for each of the third to sixth 
plaintiffs and himself.113  Therefore, Tony and the third to sixth plaintiffs each held 
a one-fifth equitable interest in the property.  As the term ‘owner’ includes a 
person who has an ‘equitable interest in the property’ condition (a) was satisfied.  
As a result, section 82(5) applied and Justice Tottle ordered that each of the third 
                                                          
 
112 Ibid [275]. 
113 Ibid [317]. 
36 
 
 
to sixth plaintiffs be paid an amount equal to one fifth of the net proceeds of sale 
of the property, once the outstanding mortgage amount had been satisfied.114 
 
The case of BJF discussed in chapter four provides another example of section 
82(5) applying in similar factual circumstances to Stavrianakos.  In this case the 
innocent party, Mrs F, was entitled to an amount equal to her one-half share as a 
joint tenant.115 
 
C. Hardship 
Section 82(3) contains a protection aimed specifically at circumstances when the 
family home is crime-used.  The protection depends on hardship and does not 
have an equivalent elsewhere in the CPCA.  It is also the only provision that allows 
an objector to object to the confiscation of the wrongdoer’s interest in the 
property.116  Consequently, in a situation of a family home held by two partners as 
joint tenants, it enables the home to be protected from confiscation.  In contrast, 
all of the other protections do not stop the confiscation and sale of the home, but 
only ensure the innocent party is compensated for the value of the confiscated 
interest.   
 
                                                          
 
114 Ibid [331]. 
115 BJF v The State of Western Australia (2011) 210 A Crim R 262, 273 [61]. 
116 The term ‘wrongdoer’ is used for the sake of simplicity to describe the individual involved who 
is not an innocent party.  No disrespect is intended.  The term ‘respondent’ cannot be used as the 
State of Western Australia is the respondent in objection proceedings. 
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In order for section 82(3) to be satisfied, a number of conditions must all be 
fulfilled before a release is granted.117  These conditions restrict the hardship 
provision to applications made by an innocent spouse, de facto partner or 
dependant who is less than 18 years old.118  The scope of this protection is reduced 
further due to criteria (f) and (g), that the objector must suffer undue hardship and 
it must not be practicable to make adequate provision for the objector by some 
other means.119 
 
The meaning of ‘undue hardship’ was considered by Justice Murray in BJF.120  
When considering criteria (f) and (g) Justice Murray relied upon decision of R v 
Lake121 which considered the then recently enacted Crimes (Confiscation of 
Profits) Act 1985 (NSW).  In this quotation Kirby P states that the hardship 
provision: 
                                                          
 
117 The conditions are: 
(a)  the objector is the spouse, a de facto partner or a dependant of an owner of 
the property; and   
(b)  the objector is an innocent party, or is less than 18 years old; and   
(c)  the objector was usually resident on the property at the time the relevant 
confiscation offence was committed, or is most likely to have been committed; 
and   
(d)  the objector was usually resident on the property at the time the objection was 
filed; and   
(e)  the objector has no other residence at the time of hearing the objection; and   
(f)  the objector would suffer undue hardship if the property is confiscated; and   
(g)  it is not practicable to make adequate provision for the objector by some other 
means. 
Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) s 82(3). 
118 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 20. 
119 Ibid. 
120 (2011) 210 A Crim R 262. 
121 (1989) 44 A Crim R 63. 
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must not be so interpreted as to frustrate the achieving of the purpose of 
Parliament in enacting the exceptional provisions of the Act.  Something more than 
ordinary hardship in the operation of the Act is therefore meant. Otherwise the Act 
would have, within it, the seeds of its own ineffectiveness in every case.122 
After considering this quote and the context of the CPCA, Justice Murray 
concluded that ‘undue hardship’ is suffering that, ‘goes beyond what is warranted 
and becomes excessive or disproportionate.’123  It must be a hardship that is 
greater than the hardship that would ‘ordinarily flow from the confiscation’.124  
Ultimately, Justice Murray concluded that although the loss of the family home 
would be significant, it would not amount to undue hardship.  If it was to amount 
to undue hardship, the result would be that confiscation of the home of an 
innocent party that was crime-used could never occur.125 
 
In Stribrny,126 Ms Stribrna was deemed not to be an innocent party, meaning that 
the criteria found in section 82(3)(b) was not met.  Nevertheless, Justice Tottle did 
consider if the hardship criteria found in section 82(3)(f) and (g) would be satisfied, 
using the definition of undue hardship from BJF.127  Justice Tottle found that 
although the confiscation would result in significant distress and hardship, 
nevertheless it did not exceed the ordinary consequences that flow from the 
confiscation of a family home.  His Honour was not satisfied that the confiscation 
                                                          
 
122 BJF v The State of Western Australia (2011) 210 A Crim R 262, 271 [47], quoting R v Lake 
(1989) 44 A Crim R 63, 66-7. 
123 Ibid 271 [48]. 
124 Ibid 271 [49]. 
125 Ibid 273 [58]-[59]. 
126 [2015] WASC 396 (22 October 2015). 
127 Ibid [73]. 
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of the property would result in the plaintiffs getting divorced and Ms Stribrna and 
her children needing to leave Australia in order to live with her family in the Czech 
Republic.128  Although not explicitly stated by Justice Tottle, it is suggested that if 
these circumstances existed, this would have constituted undue hardship. 
 
Lamers129 provides further authority that dispossession alone cannot constitute 
undue hardship.  It is also notable as the case involved property confiscation on 
the basis of a drug trafficker declaration being made, rather than due to the 
property being crime-used.  Despite this, the de facto partner of Mr Lamers, Ms 
Willis, objected to the confiscation of the house under section 82(3).  This was 
based on section 82(2) which provides that, ‘If the court finds that the property is 
crime-used, or is not required to decide whether the property is crime-used, the 
court may make an order under subsection (3) or (4).’  As the court was not 
required to determine if the property was crime-used, counsel for Ms Willis 
argued that the court could make an order under subsection (3) or (4).130  This 
submission was not accepted by Justice Templeman, who found that section 82 
applies only to crime-used property, and section 82(2) refers to circumstances ‘in 
which property is frozen on the ground that it is crime-used even though … the 
court is not required to decide whether the property was actually crime-used.’131  
                                                          
 
128 Ibid [72]. 
129 (2009) 192 A Crim R 471 (‘Lamers’).  This decision was unsuccessfully appealed in Willis v The 
State of Western Australia [No 3] [2010] WASCA 56 (31 March 2010). 
130 Lamers v Western Australia (2009) 192 A Crim R 471, 480 [64]. 
131 Ibid 481 [73]. 
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As there was no suggestion the property was crime-used, an objection could not 
be made under section 82.132   
 
D. Sections 82(7) and 83(5) 
For crime-used and crime-derived property respectively, sections 82(7) and 83(5) 
allow for a freezing notice or order to be set aside if the objector pays the State 
the amount equal to the value of the property.  Although these subsections do 
operate as protections for the family home of an innocent party, it is unlikely that 
an individual would have the financial means to be in a position to effectively buy 
back their family home from the State.133  In addition, although these sections 
protect the home, they do not protect the objector from the financial 
consequences of the confiscation.  As a result, these subsections will not be 
considered in detail. 
 
III. OTHER BASES OF CONFISCATION134 
A. Frozen Property 
Section 84 is the only protection that applies to drug trafficker declarations, 
unexplained wealth declarations, criminal benefits declarations and crime-used 
property substitution declarations before the property is confiscated.135  As this 
                                                          
 
132 Ibid 481 [74]. 
133 See, eg, BJF v The State of Western Australia (2011) 210 A Crim R 262, 273 [60]. 
134 A summary of these protections is provided in Table 2 of Appendix A.  Table 3 of Appendix A 
provides a guide to the protections considered in relation to the type of confiscation. 
135 Centurion Trust Company Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2010) 201 A Crim R 324, 
362 [159]. 
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section does not apply to crime-used and crime-derived confiscation, and the 
innocent party definition only applies to crime-used and crime-derived 
confiscation, this section does not mention innocent parties.  Nevertheless, it is 
still relevant to innocent parties as it allows for a freezing notice or order to be set 
aside if the court finds it is more likely than not that the wrongdoer does not own 
or effectively control the property, and has not at any time given it away.  As 
McLure P observed, ‘third party ownership interests in the same property will only 
be frozen and confiscated if the respondent or accused controlled those interests 
or had given them away.’136   
 
Skead argues that all this section achieves is protection from a confiscation that 
should have never occurred in the first place.  If the wrongdoer does not own or 
effectively control the property and has not given away the property, then the 
freezing order should never have been granted to begin with.137  Although this is 
true, it may also be overly simplistic, as due to the expansive definition of ‘owner’ 
contained in the CPCA, determining ownership is not necessarily a straightforward 
matter.  This is particularly apparent when there are part owners and ‘exotic’ 
forms of equitable interests involved, such as constructive and Quistclose 
trusts.138  An example of this section being used with some success in relation to a 
                                                          
 
136 Centurion Trust Company Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2010) 201 A Crim R 324, 
333-4 [31]. 
137 Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 304. 
138 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Drug Trafficker Cases’ (Paper 
presented at Legalwise Seminar, 26 March 2015) 18; see, eg, Campana v Western Australia 
[2008] WASC 230 (30 October 2008); Curran v The State of Western Australia (No 2) [2012] WASC 
464 (30 November 2014). 
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drug trafficker declaration is found in Campana v Western Australia.139  Here, Mrs 
Campana successfully protected her half share in the family home from 
confiscation.140   
 
It is important to stress that in relation to a drug trafficker declaration, that once 
this declaration is actually made, any objections under section 84, or any other 
section, become redundant.141  Section 84(2), which applies to drug trafficker 
declarations, is only of assistance when a person ‘is or will be charged’.  Once a 
person is convicted it is no longer relevant.142   
 
B. Confiscated Property 
Section 87(1) applies to the release of confiscated property, as opposed to 
property that is the subject of a freezing notice or order.143  Section 85(1) provides 
that a person may apply for the release of property that has been confiscated 
under section 6 or 7.  This applies to property that has been confiscated for any 
reason, except the property of a declared drug trafficker, which occurs under 
                                                          
 
139 [2008] WASC 230 (30 October 2008). 
140 Ibid [61]. 
141 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Drug Trafficker Cases’ (Paper 
presented at Legalwise Seminar, 26 March 2015) 17. 
142 Ibid. 
143 For a summary of when property is treated as ‘confiscated’ under the CPCA see Alain 
Musikanth, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial Client with 
an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on the Seizure 
of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 14-5. 
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section 8.144  This was confirmed in Centurion145 and Lamers where Justice 
Templeman found the court had no jurisdiction, ‘to release property confiscated 
under s 8 of the CPCA.’146  
 
Section 87(1) provides the conditions that must be satisfied for the court to order 
a release of any property under section 85.147  Section 87(3) operates in the same 
manner as sections 82(5) and 83(3) to enable an objector to receive their share in 
the property if condition (e) cannot be established.  Conditions (a), (b), (d) and (e) 
in section 87 essentially repeat the conditions found in 82(4) and 83(2).  It is only 
condition (c) which is novel to section 87.  As was noted in Centurion, condition (c) 
‘significantly restricts the power of the court to make an order for the release of 
                                                          
 
144 Alain Musikanth, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial 
Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on 
the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 16-
7; Contra Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 
304. 
145 Centurion Trust Company Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2010) 201 A Crim R 324, 
362 [162]. 
146 Lamers v Western Australia (2009) 192 A Crim R 471, 481 [59]. 
147 It must be more likely than not that: 
(a)  immediately before the confiscation of the property, the applicant owned the 
property, or was one of 2 or more owners of the property; and 
(b)  the property is not effectively controlled by a person who made criminal use of 
the property, or by a person who wholly or partly derived or realised the 
property, directly or indirectly, from the commission of a confiscation offence; 
and realised the property, directly or indirectly, from the commission of a 
confiscation offence; and   
(c)  the applicant did not become aware, and can not reasonably be expected to 
have become aware, until after the property was confiscated, that the property 
was liable to confiscation under section 6 or 7; and   
(d)  the applicant is or was an innocent party in relation to the property; and   
(e)  each other owner (if there are more than one) is or was an innocent party in 
relation to the property. 
Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) s 87(1). 
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confiscated property.’148  Although this restriction is acknowledged, there is no 
case law that illustrates the failure to fulfil condition (c) resulting in the failure of 
an objection under section 87. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The family home of an innocent party can only be completely spared from 
confiscation if the hardship provision contained in section 82(3) is satisfied.  Due 
to the strict interpretation of ‘undue hardship’, and that section 82(3) only applies 
to crime-used property, the likelihood of this occurring is remote.  If the hardship 
provision is not satisfied, the protections can only operate to protect the interest 
of the innocent party, not the home itself.  As the case of McLeod indicates, the 
fact that one is an innocent party is no guarantee that the objection will be 
successful.  The existence of other conditions beyond being an innocent party 
means that a family home can be confiscated even if all the owners are innocent 
parties.    
  
                                                          
 
148 Centurion Trust Company Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2010) 201 A Crim R 324, 
363 [167]. 
45 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: ISSUES ARISING FROM THE PROTECTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will critically consider a number of significant issues arising out of the 
protections discussed in chapter five.  These issues relate to the effective control 
condition, the hardship protection, the lack of discretion afforded the court and 
the scope of the innocent party definition.  These issues are not an exhaustive list, 
but an attempt to address the most significant issues emerging from the cases.   
  
II. EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
The most significant issue that arises from sections 82(4) and 83(2) is the 
requirement that the property is not effectively controlled by a person who made 
criminal use of the property.  This is highlighted by McLeod where in order to fulfil 
the ‘innocent party’ condition, the son had to establish that he did not know or 
have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the offence was being committed.149  
Therefore, it assisted the son to establish a degree of separation from the 
property, which he achieved successfully.  However, this degree of separation 
from the property played a large part in his failure to establish that his father did 
not have effective control of the property.   
 
The cases of McLeod and Stavrianakos share a number of factual similarities.  Both 
cases involved circumstances where the father committed drug offences on a 
                                                          
 
149 CPCA s153(1)-(2). 
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property owned by innocent family members who did not reside on the 
property.150  In Stavrianakos, the innocent parties were entitled to relief 
proportionate to their share in the property.151  In McLeod, no relief was available 
to the innocent party.152  The key difference was that in McLeod, the wrongdoer 
was not the legal owner, while in Stavrianakos the wrongdoer was the legal owner.  
Despite Mr Stavrianakos being both the legal owner and having effective control 
as a matter of fact, he did not have effective control as defined by section 156(1).  
In contrast, as the father in McLeod was not the legal owner, he could be found to 
have effective control.  The CPCA and other resources do not explain why a legal 
owner cannot also be in effective control.    
 
The explanatory notes to Criminal Property Confiscation Bill 2000 states in relation 
to clause 82(4) that, ‘It would be unjust for the crime-used property to be 
confiscated if all owners were innocent.’153  Yet this is precisely what occurred in 
McLeod as the son was the sole owner of the property.  Although it could have 
been argued that the father had an equitable interest and was therefore an 
‘owner’, this was not established.154  McLeod demonstrates that crime-used 
property can be confiscated when the property is under the effective control of 
the wrongdoer, even if all the owners are innocent parties.  Ironically, the outcome 
for the son in McLeod would have been better if his father were a joint legal owner, 
                                                          
 
150 McLeod v Western Australia (2015) 248 A Crim R 473, 474 [3]; Stavrianakos v The State of 
Western Australia [2016] WASC 64 (3 March 2016) [6]. 
151 Stavrianakos v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASC 64 (3 March 2016) [331]. 
152 McLeod v Western Australia (2015) 248 A Crim R 473, 488 [89]. 
153 Explanatory Notes, Criminal Property Confiscation Bill 2000 (WA), 47. 
154 McLeod v Western Australia (2015) 248 A Crim R 473, 487 [86]. 
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as in this case the son’s interest in the property would then have been protected, 
as the father would not have then been in effective control.  Although the house 
would still have been confiscated, the son would have received an amount equal 
to one half of the value of the property. 
 
III. THE HARDSHIP PROTECTION 
The most obvious issue with the hardship protection is that it only applies to 
property that is crime-used.  In explaining why the hardship provision applied to 
crime-used property and not crime-derived property, the Western Australian 
Parliamentary Secretary noted that,  ‘the intention of the Act is to ensure that no 
person benefits from crime.’155  A spouse or a dependant, ‘should not have the 
benefit of living in a house which has been derived from the commission of a 
confiscation offence.’156   As a result, the CPCA intentionally ensures that no one, 
even an innocent party, does not have the benefit of living in a house which has 
been derived from the commission of a confiscation offence.157  As Greaves 
succinctly explains, ‘property that is crime-derived must be confiscated, and that 
[sic] if that causes hardship to third parties, too bad. Crime should not pay.’158  It 
is likely that this same explanation also extends to confiscation resulting from drug 
trafficking, unexplained wealth and criminal benefits.159  With this explanation in 
                                                          
 
155 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8613 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 20. 
159 CPCA s 12(1). 
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mind, the exclusion of property confiscated as a result of a crime-used property 
substitution declaration from the benefit of the hardship provision is perplexing.  
No explanation is provided in the CPCA or by Parliament.    
 
An example of these difficulties is found in Western Australia v Bowers,160 where 
Mr Bowers had pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual offences against a child.161  
As the offences occurred at a home owned by the victim’s father, this property 
could not be confiscated.  As a result, a substitution order was issued and Mr 
Bowers was required to account for the full value of the property pursuant to a 
substitution declaration.  The Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) also obtained 
a freezing order under section 43(3)(c) of the CPCA over Mr Bowers’ interest in his 
matrimonial home in Bassendean.162  Justice Templeman set aside the freezing 
order on the basis that Mr Bowers had not made criminal use of the property 
owned by the victim’s father,163 and even if he had, the hardship provision was 
satisfied by Mrs Bowers.164  This decision was overturned on appeal by the DPP in 
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bowers.  McLure P, Owen and Buss JJA found 
that Mr Bowers had made criminal use of the property165 and that the hardship 
provision only applied to crime-used property, not property used as security for 
crime-used property substitution declaration proceedings.166  As a result, Mrs 
                                                          
 
160 [2009] WASC 136 (8 May 2009). 
161 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bowers (2010) 41 WAR 245, 245. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Western Australia v Bowers (8 May 2009) [25].  
164 Ibid [29]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bowers (2010) 41 WAR 245, 247 [8]. 
165 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bowers (2010) 41 WAR 245, 247 [9]. 
166 Ibid 248 [12]. 
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Bowers and her children were denied relief because Mr Bowers’ offence was not 
committed at his home, but at a home belonging to someone else.167   
 
IV. LACK OF DISCRETION 
One feature of the CPCA is the lack of discretion that the court is afforded 
regarding confiscation orders.168  This is perhaps most evident in relation to drug 
trafficker confiscations.  The court has no discretion in making a drug trafficker 
declaration169 and no discretion in declaring that all the property of the drug 
trafficker is confiscated.170  Section 84(2) provides the only avenue for relief for 
innocent parties when property is frozen as a result of a drug trafficking 
declaration.  Consequently, the only objection that can be successfully made is 
that the frozen property is not owned or effectively controlled by the wrongdoer 
and the property has not been given away by the wrongdoer.171  No discretion is 
afforded in regard to factors such as innocence, hardship or proportionality.   
 
It was explicitly observed in Whittle v Western Australia that in relation to drug 
trafficker declarations the CPCA simply does not allow for considerations of 
‘whether a confiscation is fair or just, and whether that confiscation will give rise 
                                                          
 
167 Western Australia v Bowers (8 May 2009) [32]. 
168 Stephen Hall and Jeff Scholz, ‘Ill-gotten gains?’ (2000) 27(11) Brief 6, 10 (written prior to 
Justice Hall’s appointment to the Supreme Court of Western Australia). 
169 Misuse of Drug Act 1981 (WA) s 32A(1). 
170 CPCA s 30(2), s 8 (1)-(2). 
171 CPCA s 84(1)-(2). 
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to hardship.’172  Here, the family home was confiscated as Ms Whittle was declared 
a drug trafficker.  The objection against confiscation made by the children failed 
as the drug trafficker declaration had already been made.  It was submitted by the 
next friend for the son of Ms Whittle that the children were worse off than if their 
mother had committed murder.173  He also observed the children would have 
fulfilled the protections available for crime-used and crime-derived property.174  
However, Allanson J found that, ‘general arguments relating to fairness and 
justice, are not supported by the text of the legislation.’175   
 
Likewise, in Tran v The State of Western Australia the ‘difficulties in the life of the 
plaintiff and members of his family’176 could not be considered in relation to drug 
trafficker confiscations.  Mr Tran was a refugee from Vietnam.177  He lived in his 
family home with his wife and daughter for four years, before leaving to live with 
his girlfriend.178  At this time he signed a statutory declaration which he believed 
divested him of his interest in the family home.  However, Martino J found this 
declaration was not effective and that even if it was, the transfer would have been 
                                                          
 
172 Whittle v Western Australia [2012] WASC 244 (5 July 2012) [47] (‘Whittle’), quoted in Natalie 
Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 306. 
173 Whittle v Western Australia [2012] WASC 244 (5 July 2012) [32]. 
174 Ibid [34]. 
175 Ibid [47]. 
176 Tran v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 200 (20 July 2017) [21] (‘Tran’). 
177 Ibid [11]. 
178 Ibid. 
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a gift and therefore, the home would still have been confiscated.179  As no 
discretion was available, the order for confiscation had to be made.180 
 
V. INNOCENT PARTY DEFINITION 
As section 87(1) mirrors the provisions in sections 82(4) and 83(2), the same issue 
regarding effective control arises.  However, an additional issue does arise in 
section 87(1) in relation to innocent parties.  As has been noted, section 87 applies 
to property that has been confiscated for any reason,181 except property of a 
declared drug trafficker.  The problem that arises is that the definition of innocent 
party in section 153 of the CPCA only applies to crime-used and crime-derived 
property,182 yet sections 87(1)(d) and (e) both require the innocent party 
definition to be satisfied.  Further, section 87(1)(b) refers to effective control, but 
only in relation to property that is crime-used or crime-derived.183  Skead 
speculates that either the failure to include any reference to the other confiscation 
bases is deliberate so that the process for obtaining the release of property is far 
easier, or the more likely scenario that the failure to include the other confiscation 
bases in the definitions is a drafting oversight.184  This oversight leaves the 
                                                          
 
179 Ibid [19]; CPCA s 8(1)(b). 
180 Tran v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 200 (20 July 2017) [21]. 
181 ‘Any reason’ being unexplained wealth, criminal benefits, crime-used property, crime-derived 
property and crime-used property substitution. 
182 Bennett & Co (a Firm) v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2005) 31 WAR 212, 226 [61], 
quoted in Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation 
in Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property 
and Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 215. 
183 Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in 
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and 
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 215. 
184 Ibid. 
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application of section 87 to these bases unclear.185  In the present state of 
ambiguity, the correct principle of construction would be to interpret section 87, 
‘so as to respect a person’s property rights’.186  As noted by Cole JA, ‘Unless no 
other interpretation is possible, justice requires that statutes should not be 
construed so as to enable the confiscation of an individual's property without 
payment of just compensation.’187   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The protections contained in the CPCA give rise to a number of issues.  Amongst 
the most obvious and significant in relation to a family home are the effective 
control criteria contained in sections 82(4)(b), 83(2)(b) and 87(1)(b) and the 
exclusion of property confiscated as a result of a crime-used property substitution 
declaration from the hardship protections.  The lack of discretion afforded the 
court, particularly in relation to section 84, is problematic as the protections can 
only apply if the property is not owned or effectively controlled by the wrongdoer 
and the property has not been given away by the wrongdoer.  There is no scope 
for the court to consider hardship, innocence or proportionality.  The protection 
for confiscated property is also problematic, as conditions (b) and (d) of section 
87(1) can only be fulfilled if the property is crime-used or crime-derived.  How 
                                                          
 
185 Ibid. 
186 Jeffrey v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1995) 79 A Crim R 514, 517 quoted in Director of 
Public Prosecutions (WA) v White (2009) 194 A Crim R 192, 202; see also Permanent Trustee Co 
Ltd v Western Australia (2002) 26 WAR 1, 6 [29]. 
187 Jeffrey v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1995) 79 A Crim R 514, 517 quoted in Director of 
Public Prosecutions (WA) v White (2009) 194 A Crim R 192, 202. 
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these conditions apply to confiscation resulting from unexplained wealth, criminal 
benefits and crime-used property substitution declarations is unknown. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of issues relating to the protections for innocent parties contained in 
the CPCA have been observed.  This chapter makes recommendations to address 
these issues with the aim of improving the protections available to innocent 
parties whose family home is confiscated or subject to confiscation.  These 
recommendations seek to improve the consistency and clarity of the protections, 
without undermining the purpose of the CPCA. 
 
II. EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
The first recommendation is to alter the application of the effective control 
condition found in sections 82(4)(b), 83(2)(b), 84(1), 84(2) and 87(1)(b).  As the 
comparison of McLeod and Stavrianakos illustrates, the effective control condition 
can result in a significant disparity in outcome, with no justifiable reasoning.  As a 
determination that effective control exists effectively means that the wrongdoer 
was a de facto owner of the property, it is appropriate that an innocent party is 
protected in the same manner as if the wrongdoer was an owner.  Therefore, the 
effective control condition should be amended so that the innocent party would 
be entitled to a proportionate share in the property.  For example, in McLeod if 
the father had been a non-innocent owner, the son would have been entitled to 
half of the value of the property, rather than receiving no protection at all.  
Applying the effective control condition in this manner would ensure that an 
innocent party is protected consistently, regardless of whether the wrongdoer has 
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a legal estate in the property or not.  This amendment would not undermine the 
intention of the CPCA, rather it would simply ensure that the innocent owner is 
protected in a consistent manner. 
 
Any argument that this amendment would lead to individuals seeking to avoid 
confiscation by registering property in the name of another person is without 
foundation.  Only a proportion of the property would be exempt from 
confiscation, and as such it is no more open to abuse than the current possibility 
of having multiple legal owners of a property to reduce the proportion of the 
property that is confiscated.  The possibility of avoiding confiscation in this manner 
is further reduced by the fact that a person is not an innocent party if that person 
acquired the property with the intention of avoiding the operation of the CPCA.188   
 
Additionally, in appropriate cases the court has been willing to find the existence 
of a trust in relation to property, which enables the property to be confiscated 
despite the wrongdoer not being the legal owner.  An example of this is found in 
the case of Curran v The State of Western Australia (No 2)189 where the parents of 
a declared drug trafficker were found to be holding the property on constructive 
trust for the drug trafficker.  As a result, the drug trafficker was determined to be 
the owner of the property and the property was confiscated.190  Despite the drug 
                                                          
 
188 CPCA ss 153(3)(d), 153(4)(e). 
189 [2012] WASC 464 (30 November 2014) (‘Curran’). 
190 Curran v The State of Western Australia (No 2) [2012] WASC 464 (30 November 2014) [99]. 
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trafficker not being the legal owner, as the property was being held on trust for 
him, the confiscation was appropriate.191  Amending the application of the 
effective control condition as discussed would have no impact on this outcome.   
 
Finally, in relation to crime-used property, the effective control definition should 
be applied cautiously.  Unlike the other bases of confiscation, if effective control 
does not exist, a confiscation order may still be made.  For crime-used property, a 
substitution order can be made when the wrongdoer does not own or have 
effective control of the crime-used property.192  As a result, in situations where 
there is any doubt about the existence of effective control, it is preferable for 
effective control to be found not to exist, and for a substitution order to be made.  
This approach ensures an innocent owner’s home is not confiscated incorrectly.  
This would be an ideal outcome in cases like McLeod, as it protects the property 
rights of the innocent party, without frustrating the intention of the CPCA.  
 
The effective control condition should be amended so that if the wrongdoer is 
found to have effective control, the outcome for the innocent party would be the 
same as if the wrongdoer were a ‘non-innocent’ owner.  This amendment would 
remove the discrepancy in protection provided to the innocent parties evident in 
McLeod and Stavrianakos.  Again, the amendment would not undermine the 
                                                          
 
191 Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 302. 
192 CPCA s 22(2)(b); White v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2011) 243 CLR 478, 490 [36]. 
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intention of the CPCA, but would ensure an innocent party has some protection 
regardless of whether the wrongdoer is the legal owner or not.  Ideally a 
substitution mechanism, like the mechanism for crime-used property, would exist 
for all types of confiscation.  Such a mechanism would enable the effective control 
condition to be removed altogether, as a substitution order could be made against 
the wrongdoer, which would protect the innocent owner.  As this mechanism does 
not exist, the proposed amendment is the preferred solution, as it provides 
consistency and some protection for innocent owners.  However, in relation to 
crime-used property, a substitution order should be ordered where possible to 
protect the innocent owner. 
 
III. THE HARDSHIP PROTECTION 
The hardship provision is severely limited by the fact that only a spouse, de facto 
partner or a dependant of an owner of the property who is usually resident at the 
property and is either an innocent party or less than 18 years old can object.  
Added to this is the requirement that the objector must suffer undue hardship, 
meaning that the hardship must go beyond the hardship ordinarily resulting from 
the confiscation of a family home.193  The cases in this area, such as Stribrny, 
demonstrate how difficult it is to meet the conditions required for a successful 
objection under section 82(3).  These limitations, although harsh, are appropriate 
                                                          
 
193 Stribrny v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASC 396 (22 October 2015) [73]. 
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since, ‘otherwise the Act, would have, within it, the seeds of its own 
ineffectiveness in every case.’194  
 
The problem with the hardship provision is not the strictness of its application, but 
that it does not apply to confiscation resulting from crime-used property 
substitution.  In relation to crime-derived property, unexplained wealth and 
criminal benefits, this is justified by parliament’s intention that ‘no person should 
benefit from crime.’195  Although not explicitly articulated, it is a reasonable 
assumption given the purpose of the CPCA, that drug trafficker confiscations are 
excluded from the hardship provision as a further deterrent for this activity.  
However, there is no justification for the hardship provision not to apply to crime-
used property substitution, as the case of Bowers illustrates.  Due purely to the 
fact that Mr Bowers’ offence was not committed at his home, but at a home 
belonging to someone else, Mrs Bowers and her children were unable to access 
the hardship protection.  This outcome is unjust, as rather than the punishment 
fitting the crime, the punishment was determined by where the offence took 
place.196 
 
                                                          
 
194 R v Lake (1989) 44 A Crim R 63, 67. 
195 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8613 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
196 See also Natalie Skead, ‘Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?’ (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia 
Law Journal 67, 85. 
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As confirmed by the High Court decision in White,197 when it comes to 
confiscation, any property that is determined to be crime-used can lead to a 
substitution order being made.  However, when it comes to the objection 
provisions, a distinction between crime-used property and property subject to a 
crime-used substitution order is maintained.  This was noted by Templeman J in 
the first instance judgment in Bowers who found, ‘where s 82 refers to crime-used 
property, the legislature must have intended it to apply also to property which is 
substituted for crime-used property, thereby avoiding what would otherwise be 
an unjust result’.198  The Court of Appeal disagreed, upholding the DPP’s appeal 
and stating ‘there is no proper basis to conclude that the legislature intended that 
s 82(3)’ applied to substituted property.199  This is ‘an extremely unjust result’200 
that can only be explained by drafting oversight.  The CPCA should be amended to 
ensure that all crime-used property confiscation, both direct and by a substitution 
declaration, are subject to the hardship protection.  
 
IV. AFFORD GREATER DISCRETION TO THE COURT 
Although these specific recommendations would result in the injustices evident in 
McLeod and Bowers being avoided in the future, these injustices could arguably 
have been prevented if the court had been afforded greater judicial discretion.  
Given the significant impact that can result from property confiscation it is an 
                                                          
 
197 White v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2011) 243 CLR 478. 
198 Western Australia v Bowers [2009] WASC 136 (8 May 2009) [33]. 
199 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bowers (2010) 41 WAR 245, 248 [14]. 
200 Western Australia v Bowers [2009] WASC 136 (8 May 2009) [32]. 
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appropriate safeguard, particularly in relation to innocent parties, for the courts 
to be, ‘vested with a discretion to consider the ramifications of the confiscation 
and vary orders made.’201   
 
An example of a situation where this discretion would be appropriate is in drug 
trafficker confiscation.    Under the Misuse of Drug Act 1981 (WA) (‘MDA’) a person 
is declared to be a drug trafficker based on either a single offence that exceeds an 
amount listed in Schedule 7 or 8, or by being convicted of three or more serious 
drug offences within ten years.202  Under Schedule 8 of the MDA, the number of 
cannabis plants for the purposes of drug trafficking is twenty.  Cases such as 
McLeod, BJF and Stribrny, demonstrate that when property is used for drug related 
offences but the criteria for a drug trafficker declaration are not satisfied, the 
property will be confiscated as crime-used.203  As a crime-used property 
confiscation, an innocent party could object under section 82(4) and the hardship 
provision, section 82(3).  However, if the property had been used to grow twenty 
or more cannabis plants, an innocent party could only object under section 84(2).  
It is difficult to see any reasonable explanation as to why an innocent party can 
have the benefit of a hardship provision when the party’s spouse has cultivated 
seventeen cannabis plants (as in BJF), but if three more plants had been cultivated, 
                                                          
 
201 Natalie Skead and Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’ (2015) 38(2) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 455, 468. 
202 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Drug Trafficker Cases’ (Paper 
presented at Legalwise Seminar, 26 March 2015) 2. 
203 The amount of cannabis plants grown were fifteen in McLeod, seventeen in BJF and fourteen 
in Stribrny.   
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the hardship provision would not apply.  Affording the court some discretion 
would be valuable in such a circumstance.  This is in keeping with the purpose of 
the CPCA, since one of the reasons the hardship provision was included in the 
CPCA was to protect innocent spouses and dependents when the family home is 
used for hydroponic drug cultivation.204 
 
Additionally, as a result of the operation of section 159(2)(e) and section 160, a 
person can be taken to be a declared drug trafficker when a person is charged and 
then absconds or dies before the charge is disposed of or finally determined.  As 
Skead notes, this results in the concerning potential for all of a deceased person’s 
property to be confiscated if the deceased was charged with a drug-related 
offence, a warrant of arrest was issued, and the deceased died before the matter 
was finally resolved.205  In this situation, it would again be beneficial for the court 
to have some discretion in protecting an innocent party, such as the partner of the 
deceased.  In addition to these hypothetical situations, cases such as Whittle and 
Tran demonstrate other factual situations where providing some judicial 
discretion would be valuable in ensuring the protection are applied appropriately. 
 
                                                          
 
204 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8613 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
205 Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 301. 
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The Commonwealth equivalent of the CPCA, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) 
(‘PoCA’) does enable the court to retain discretion in some circumstances.  For 
example, forfeiture of crime-used property is always discretionary, despite there 
being generally no discretion in relation to crime-derived property.206   In relation 
to crime-used property, section 48(3) PoCA allows the court to consider any 
hardship that may be caused, the ordinary use of the property and the gravity of 
the offence or offences when considering a forfeiture order.  It also allows the 
discretion to consider the public interest in a number of circumstances.207   
 
It is evident that the CPCA was drafted in such a way to ensure the confiscation 
powers have a very wide scope and application.  The Explanatory Notes contains 
numerous comments that a definition is defined broadly to ensure the effective 
operation of the CPCA.208  This scope was observed during the parliamentary 
debates surrounding the CPCA, where it was remarked that the CPCA ‘is cast more 
widely than the evil to which it is directed.’209  As a result, some judicial discretion 
is appropriate to protect innocent parties caught in the expansive net of 
confiscation powers contained in the CPCA.  The introduction of ‘a guided judicial 
discretion’ into the CPCA, that allows ‘the courts to take into account 
                                                          
 
206 Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived 
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 24-5. 
207 See, eg, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) ss 17(4), 19(3), 20(4) 20A(4), 47(4), 49(4), 57(a), 
103(b), 154(a), 179EA(6)(b). 
208 Explanatory Notes, Criminal Property Confiscation Bill 2000 (WA), 67-72. 
209 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 September 2000, 935 (Jim 
McGinty), quoted in Natalie Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western 
Australia Law Journal 67, 75. 
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considerations of proportionality, hardship and public interest is desirable.’210  This 
is true generally, but is particularly so when a confiscation impacts upon the family 
home of an innocent party. 
 
V. CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF THE INNOCENT PARTY DEFINITION 
The final issue relates to the protection contained in section 87.  As has been 
noted, the definition of innocent party in section 153 of the CPCA only applies to 
crime-used and crime-derived property,211 yet sections 87(1)(d) and (e) both 
require the innocent party definition to be satisfied.  Further, section 87(1)(b) 
refers to effective control, but only in relation to property that is crime-used or 
crime-derived.212  As section 87 applies to property that has been confiscated for 
all reasons,213 except property of a declared drug trafficker, it is appropriate to 
amend the innocent party definition to ensure that innocent parties in relation to 
unexplained wealth, criminal benefits and crime-used property substitution are 
included in this protection.   
 
                                                          
 
210 Natalie Skead and Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’ (2015) 38(2) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 455, 483. 
211 Bennett & Co (a Firm) v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2005) 31 WAR 212, 226 [61], 
quoted in Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation 
in Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property 
and Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 215. 
212 Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in 
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and 
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 215. 
213 All reasons being unexplained wealth, criminal benefits, crime-used property, crime-derived 
property and crime-used property substitution. 
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Although section 87 does not apply to drug trafficker confiscation, the expansion 
of the innocent party definition should also relate to drug trafficker confiscation.  
If this is done, then the innocent party condition can be included in sections 84(1) 
and 84(2), resulting in consistency across all of the protections.  As the CPCA 
currently stands the only requirements for a successful objection under section 84 
is that the individual establishes ownership and that the wrongdoer does not 
control that ownership or had not given away that ownership.  Unlike the crime-
used and crime-derived protections, the ‘innocence’ of the owner is not 
considered, which makes a successful objection easier to obtain.  This is 
particularly unusual given the intention of the CPCA was to target unexplained 
wealth and the drug trade.214 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Significant improvements could be made to the protections contained in the CPCA 
as a result of some minor changes.  The four recommendations made in this 
chapter, amending the effective control provision, expanding the hardship 
provision to include crime-used property substitution orders, the introduction of 
a guided judicial discretion, and amending the innocent party definition to cover 
all bases of confiscation, would improve the consistency and clarity of these 
protections, while remaining consistent with the intended purpose of the CPCA. 
                                                          
 
214 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan 
Barron-Sullivan). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
A person can only be an ‘innocent party’ as defined by the CPCA if the confiscation 
is in relation to crime-used and crime-derived property.  To be ‘innocent’ the 
individual must not have known and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that the confiscation offence was being or would be committed.  If a person 
satisfies this definition, the only way that the family home can be completely 
protected from confiscation is if the hardship provision contained in section 82(3) 
of the CPCA is satisfied.  This provision is only available to crime-used property.  
There are a number of criteria that must be satisfied, but critically the objector 
must be an innocent spouse, de facto or dependent of the owner, and must be 
able to demonstrate that the confiscation would result in suffering that is greater 
than the hardship that would ‘ordinarily flow from the confiscation’.215  If the 
hardship provision is not applicable, then an innocent party is only able to protect 
that party’s interest in the family home.  This means that the home is still 
confiscated and sold, but after the sale the innocent party is paid an amount equal 
to the value of that interest.216    
 
In relation to crime-used and crime-derived property, the interest of an innocent 
party can be protected by establishing innocence, ownership and that the 
property is not effectively controlled by the person who committed the offence.217  
                                                          
 
215 BJF v The State of Western Australia (2011) 210 A Crim R 262, 271 [49]. 
216 CPCA ss 82(5), 83(3). 
217 CPCA ss 82(4), 83(5). 
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If the confiscation does not relate to crime-used or crime-derived property, the 
objector must establish that wrongdoer does not own or effectively control the 
property, and has not at any time given it away.  There is no requirement that the 
objector be an innocent party.218  Finally, for all types of confiscation except drug 
trafficker confiscation, an objection can be made for release of the confiscated 
property provided the objector is an innocent party, an owner of the property, the 
property is not effectively controlled by the wrongdoer and the objector is not 
aware the property was liable for confiscation, and could not reasonably have 
been expected to become aware, until after the confiscation took place.219 
 
Cases such as McLeod and Bowers are instructive in demonstrating the injustice 
that can result under the current operation of the protections.  In order to improve 
the protections and ensure that they operate in a consistent and equitable 
manner, it is suggested that the effective control condition is amended, the 
hardship provision is expanded to include crime-used property substitution 
orders, some guided judicial discretion is introduced, and the innocent party 
definition is amended to include all bases of confiscation.  Such amendments 
would not defeat the intention of the CPCA, but would ensure that the protections 
that currently exist are effective in protecting the property of innocent owners.   
 
                                                          
 
218 CPCA s 84(1)-(2). 
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This thesis has provided an overview of the extent a family home of an innocent 
party is protected by the CPCA.  This overview has revealed the protections to be 
severely limited.  There are a number of circumstances in which the home of an 
innocent person can be confiscated.  Even with the amendments proposed by this 
thesis, the protections would still be limited to very specific circumstances, in 
keeping with the object of the CPCA.  Although the application of the protections 
may still be harsh in some circumstances, such as the hardship protection, the 
protections will be significantly easier to construe and apply.  This thesis has not 
attempted to radically alter the scope of the protections, merely to ensure that 
what currently exists is coherent and consistent.  As the protections currently 
stand they could aptly be described as ‘perplexing and difficult to construe’ and 
‘extreme’.220  When it comes to an innocent person attempting to protect their 
family home, this is a completely unacceptable situation that requires 
rectification. 
  
                                                          
 
220 Centurion Trust Company Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2010) 201 A Crim R 324, 
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF PROTECTIONS FOR INNOCENT PARTIES 
I. TABLE 1: CRIME-USED AND CRIME-DERIVED PROTECTIONS 
 
 
Section
Type of Confiscation
Conditions
82(4)
Crim
e-Used
(a) the objector is the ow
ner of the property, or is one of 2 or m
ore ow
ners of the property
(b) the property is not effectively controlled by a person w
ho m
ade crim
inal use of the property
(c) the objector is an innocent party in relation to the property
(d) each other ow
ner (if there are m
ore than one) is an innocent party in relation to the property
83(2)
Crim
e-Derived
(a) the objector is the ow
ner of the property, or is one of 2 or m
ore ow
ners of the property
(b) the property is not effectively controlled by a person w
ho w
holly or partly derived or realised the 
property, directly or indirectly, from
 the com
m
ission of a confiscation offence.
(c) the objector is an innocent party in relation to the property
(d) each other ow
ner (if there are m
ore than one) is an innocent party in relation to the property
82(3)
Crim
e-Used
(a) the objector is the spouse, a de facto partner or a dependant of an ow
ner of the property
(b) the objector is an innocent party, or is less than 18 years old
(c) the objector w
as usually resident on the property at the tim
e the relevant confiscation offence 
w
as com
m
itted, or is m
ost likely to have been com
m
itted
(d) the objector w
as usually resident on the property at the tim
e the objection w
as filed
(e) the objector has no other residence at the tim
e of hearing the objection
(f) the objector w
ould suffer undue hardship if the property is confiscated
(g) it is not practicable to m
ake adequate provision for the objector by som
e other m
eans.
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II. TABLE 2: PROTECTIONS FROM OTHER TYPES OF CONFISCATION 
 
Section
Type of Confiscation
Conditions
84(1)
U
nexplained W
ealth
D
oes not ow
n or effectively control the property
Crim
inal Benefits
H
as not given the property aw
ay
Crim
e-U
sed Property 
Substitution
84(2)
D
rug Trafficker
D
oes not ow
n or effectively control the property
H
as not given the property aw
ay
87(1)
Crim
e-U
sed
A
pplies to confiscated property only
Crim
e-D
erived
(a) im
m
ediately before the confiscation of the property, the applicant ow
ned the property, or w
as 
one of 2 or m
ore ow
ners of the property
U
nexplained W
ealth
(b) the property is not effectively controlled by a person w
ho m
ade crim
inal use of the property, or 
by a person w
ho w
holly or partly derived or realised the property, directly or indirectly, from
 the 
com
m
ission of a confiscation offence
Crim
inal Benefits
(c) the applicant did not becom
e aw
are, and can not reasonably be expected to have becom
e aw
are, 
until after the property w
as confiscated, that the property w
as liable to confiscation under section 6 
or 7 
Crim
e-U
sed Property 
Substitution
(d) the applicant is or w
as an innocent party in relation to the property
(e) each other ow
ner (if there are m
ore than one) is or w
as an innocent party in relation to the 
property
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III. TABLE 3: PROTECTIONS BY TYPE OF CONFISCATION 
 
Type of Confiscation
 Section
O
verview
Crim
e-Used
82(4)
Applicant is an innocent ow
ner, property not effectively controlled by w
rong-doer, each other ow
ner is an 
innocent party
82(3)
Hardship Provision- only available to spouse, de facto or dependant of an ow
ner of the property
87(1)
Applicant w
as an innocent ow
ner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by w
rong-
doer, applicant w
as not aw
are property w
as going to be confiscated, each other ow
ner is an innocent party
Crim
e-Derived
83(2)
Applicant is an innocent ow
ner, property not effectively controlled by w
rong-doer, each other ow
ner is an 
innocent party
87(1)
Applicant w
as an innocent ow
ner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by w
rong-
doer, applicant w
as not aw
are property w
as going to be confiscated, each other ow
ner is an innocent party
Drug Trafficker
84(2)
The w
rong-doer does not ow
n or effectively control the property and has not given the property aw
ay
Unexplained W
ealth
84(1)
The w
rong-doer does not ow
n or effectively control the property and has not given the property aw
ay
87(1)
Applicant w
as an innocent ow
ner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by w
rong-
doer, applicant w
as not aw
are property w
as going to be confiscated, each other ow
ner is an innocent party
Crim
inal Benefits
84(1)
The w
rong-doer does not ow
n or effe ctively control the property and has not given the property aw
ay
87(1)
Applicant w
as an innocent ow
ner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by w
rong-
doer, applicant w
as not aw
are property w
as going to be confiscated, each other ow
ner is an innocent party
Crim
e-Used Property 
Substitution
84(1)
Th e w
rong-doer does not ow
n or effectively control the property and has not given the property aw
ay
87(1)
Applicant w
as an innocent ow
ner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by w
rong-
doer, applicant w
as not aw
are property w
as going t o be confiscated, each other ow
ner is an innocent party
